A quiet revolution took root in a small conference room in Islamabad as the city baked under the hot July 2024 sun, with Pakistan grappling with post-budget economic stress. Former PML-N prime minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, now a reformist, was joined by Miftah Ismail and a group of frustrated technocrats in launching the Awaam Pakistan Party (APP). This was not a typical rally with loud slogans but a strategic launch of a party built around a central structure aimed at driving change within the system. Amid political fatigue among Pakistan’s elites, the emergence of APP raises a key question: can a group of capable leaders break the so-called Nizaam, which has long been used to entrench itself at the expense of ordinary people? This column decodes the blueprint of APP, its necessity, and the opportunity it offers to shape Pakistan’s future.
The politics of Pakistan has been a graveyard of promise and betrayal, with parties such as PML-N, PPP, and PTI continuously playing power games. At the same time, the people, the Awaam, have to endure without even basic dignity. PML-N’s cronyism in Punjab, PPP’s feudal dominance in Sindh, and PTI’s populist euphoria have not led to sustainable development. Conventional parties, which Abbasi sharply criticized when launching APP, act on the principle of seizing power at any cost because they prefer short-term populism and elite alliances over long-term welfare. The result? According to the APP vision document, the country ranks 133rd out of 180 on the Transparency International corruption perceptions index. Youth unemployment is at 11%, and one-third of the population experiences child stunting.
The need for APP lies in its ability to break such a vicious cycle. Its electoral system is designed to serve the interests of the people rather than personal gain, representing a radical departure from the dynasty and patronage models of its competitors. At its core is a Convener, Abbasi himself, who guides policy through a 20-member organizing committee that includes experienced former bureaucrats, economists such as Miftah Ismail, and activists like Dr. Zafar Mirza and Sardar Mehtab Abbasi. This is not superficial reform; it is a deliberate effort to safeguard decision-making from the corruption that flourishes in Pakistan’s political landscape. By introducing meritocracy and transparency—two essential elements—APP aims to fill the void left by parties that rely on personality cults or feudal loyalties.
The key feature of APP is its operational engine—a simplified system that lacks charisma or connections to its center. Competence is the entry requirement for APP, unlike the Khan-centric focus in PTI or the Sharif-family dynasty in PML-N. To be part of Awaam Pakistan, you must be competent and have a good reputation, Abbasi announced at the launch. Under a central executive, there are specialized policy wings for the economy, health, and foreign affairs, each accountable to a new Truth Commission tasked with recording national realities without denialism, which is common in Pakistani political discourse. Intra-party voting will ensure that leadership isn’t held by inheritance, directly challenging the dynastic control of PML-N and PPP.
This organization is based on positive experiences from other countries, such as Germany, where the CDU has been highly successful in technocratic leadership that promotes consensus rather than autocracy. Pakistan, a country with a history of military-bureaucratic elite interference in civilian governance, as seen in the 2024 election sham, regards APP as an impenetrable barrier against such interference. Its policies, particularly its decentralized party policy committees, are inclusive, featuring quotas for women and minorities in the executive branch, aligning with its vision of equal opportunity for all.
The vision of APP extends beyond the center to the provinces in Pakistan, where government functions often deteriorate into ethnic fiefdoms or patronage networks. In May 2025, after Karachi was overwhelmed by monsoon rains, exposing its crumbling infrastructure, Miftah Ismail chaired a historic meeting in a small office in Clifton, announcing the provincial structure of the megacity of Sindh under the name APP. All seven tehsils (from Central to Malir) appointed district leaders, with Sheikh Salahuddin serving as Convener. This was not a mere elite spectacle but a grassroots mobilization, embodying the APP slogan: “Taakat Sirf Awaam Ki” (Power Belongs to the People). Policy teams on health, economy, and security have deputy conveners, such as Faisal Khanani, who focus on vulnerable populations, including a rural widow in Balochistan or a child of a laborer in Karachi.
The structure of APP in Sindh, where Karachi’s 16 million residents seek solutions to water shortages and ethnic conflicts, must contend with feudal dominance over their cities. Unlike the failing Khyber Pakhtunkhwa experiment by the PTI or the urban militancy of the MQM, APP develops through the consultation of union councils, as seen in the March 2025 meetings of ICT, which ensure that local voices influence the agendas. In the World Bank 2025 Pakistan Economic Update, Karachi contributes 25 percent of the GDP with minimal service provision—APP aims to change this by implementing localized welfare inspections, similar to the PDI-P in Indonesia’s post-Suharto decentralization, which kept the elite in check.
The urgency of APP’s mission cannot be doubted. The Awaam of urban Sindh (ILO 2025) desire reform options, given the 40 percent unemployment rate in urban areas, and 68 percent of young people in cities distrust dynastic parties (Gallup Pakistan 2025). Last month, I interviewed Fatima, a young engineer in Lahore who had gone to Dubai after PTI’s unkept job promises. She stated that we do not need slogans, but systems, which aligns with APP’s vision of a Khushaal Pakistan where hard work brings dignity. A tehsil meeting with a farmer in Sargodha recounted how PPP subsidies were bypassed in his family, forcing them to migrate. His perspective on the stakes of systemic failure in the Pakistani story was expressed in his quote: ‘APP listens.’
The differentiation of APP enhances its potential. By February 2025, when the Election Commission of Pakistan granted it the use of a symbol—the arrow—APP had established central committees in the main cities, demonstrating organizational stability uncommon for a new party. Dawn analysts project that it will secure a 5-8 percent vote share in 2028, with momentum, and Brookings predicts a 10 percent share in Sindh alone by tapping into economic discontent. APP does not heavily criticize the budget increases of PPP or the retrogressive taxes of PML-N; instead, it criticizes the status quo without the rhetoric typical of its actual opposition, as Abbasi noted in June 2025.
The core and provincial engines by APP offer a two-fold critique of flawed federalism and elite capture in Pakistan. In the long run, its model could promote changes in federalism, decentralizing power to the provinces and strengthening the drive to fight corruption. In the short term, it challenges the PML-N-PPP duopoly, making them more accountable. As of September 2025, APP’s provincial activations in four units have established over 200 local chapters, according to X updates, and are on the verge of breakthroughs in metropolitan areas where anti-elite sentiment is growing.
Yet, challenges loom. The Pakistani political scene is a comedy of bad decisions, where PTI’s anti-corruption fervor has turned into vindictiveness, and PML-N’s development agenda appears to be a crony offer in disguise. APP must navigate this complex situation carefully, avoiding the populist trap or co-option by the military, which has occurred in the past based on historical precedents. Its future success will depend on its grassroots mobilization and translating its vision into tangible welfare initiatives—such as energy hubs, IT skills development, and decentralized education and health systems—as outlined in its vision document.
The blueprint of APP contrasts with Pakistan’s elite-driven Nizaam; it is a merit-based engine that democratizes politics. To stakeholders, whether Karachi traders or Balochistan farmers, it appears democratic in its potential. The message is clear: join APP, demand intra-party elections, and prioritize competence in 2028. For Pakistan’s younger generation, such as Fatima or Ahmed, or the Malir factory worker made jobless by load-shedding, APP offers hope beyond the dysfunctional dynasties. We support this engine, and a Khushal future is guaranteed. Take action now—host local forums, support APP candidates, and help reclaim Pakistan’s destiny.
